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COMMENTS 
“YOU MAY BE DOWN AND OUT,  
BUT YOU AIN’T BEATEN”:  
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR 
INCARCERATED WORKERS 
KEITH ARMSTRONG* 
The Supreme Court’s sweeping 1977 decision in Jones v. North 
Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union determined that a state’s reasonable 
interest in maintaining security in a correctional facility outweighed 
prisoners’ freedom of association in seeking to unionize.  This decision had 
a chilling effect on a burgeoning prisoners’ union movement which had risen 
to prominence over the course of the 1970s.  Since Jones, prison labor has 
increased and changed form: the Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) Act of 
1979 authorized private firms to sell prisoner-made goods on the open 
market.  At the same time, prisoners continue to work in more traditional 
jobs within prisons, such as cooking, cleaning, and manufacturing license 
plates. 
After Jones, prisoners have not been able to assert a constitutional right 
to associate, but they have continued to struggle for labor protections.  These 
efforts have mostly taken the form of unauthorized prison strikes.  The largest 
recent strike involved inmates in over seventeen states. 
Issues involving prison labor have moved to the forefront of 
conversations on criminal justice reform. Recently, scholars have examined 
the ways in which unions of incarcerated workers might make use of federal 
 
 * J.D.-LL.M. International Human Rights, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. A 
heartfelt thank you to all who played a part in this endeavor. Professor Alan Mills provided 
thoughtful feedback and advice on the early drafts of this article. Members of the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology helped bring this article to fruition in its final form with 
diligent edits and helpful comments, specifically Emelia Carroll, Ellie Graham, Mohit 
Agarwal, Mason Willis, Elliot Knuths, and Mike Trucco. Finally, Abigail Sexton supported 
me in countless ways throughout the writing and revision process. 
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labor law, including the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to gain 
recognition as collective bargaining units.  However, even if these efforts 
succeed, their impacts would be limited to incarcerated workers involved in 
the PIE program or to those working in private industries in private prisons.  
The vast majority of incarcerated workers who do not work in private 
industries would be excluded. 
As a complementary approach, and in order to expand labor protections 
to those incarcerated workers who would not be covered by the NLRA, 
incarcerated workers may also wish to look to state labor law for protections.  
This Comment surveys state public employee collective bargaining statutes.  
Some states categorically exclude prisoners from their definition of “public 
employee” or do not permit any association of public employees to engage 
in collective bargaining.  However, other states have broad definitions that 
could conceivably include prisoners.  Advocates of incarcerated worker 
union organizing may wish to focus their efforts on these states.  If 
incarcerated worker unions are able to organize under state or federal labor 
law, then they may eventually be able to demonstrate that such associations 
are beneficial rather than detrimental to maintaining order in prisons, which 
could help chip away at the overbroad holding in Jones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.1 seemed to signal 
a death-knell for labor organizing in the prison setting.2  Writing for the 
Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist held that a state’s reasonable interest in 
maintaining security in a correctional facility outweighs the freedom of 
association of prisoners seeking to unionize.3  In spite of this decision, 
associations of incarcerated workers have persevered over the past forty 
years.  In August 2018, prison labor organizing gained national prominence 
when inmates in over seventeen states organized a major prison strike4 in 
which participants called for “an immediate end to prison slavery.”5  
Furthermore, they demanded that “[a]ll persons imprisoned in any place of 
detention . . .  be paid the prevailing wage in their state or territory for their 
labor.”6  The striking prisoners made a series of other concrete requests, 
including broad reforms to prison conditions.7 
 
 1 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
 2 See Sidney Zonn, Inmate Unions: An Appraisal of Prisoner Rights and Labor 
Implications, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 613, 614 (1978) (“The continued vitality of [prisoner labor 
unions] is now threatened due to the recent Supreme Court decision of Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.”). 
 3 Jones, 433 U.S. at 133. 
 4 Nicole Lewis, What’s Really Happening With the National Prison Strike?, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/24/what-s
-really-happening-with-the-national-prison-strike [https://perma.cc/YRR3-9AUF]. This strike 
was organized with the support of the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee of the 
Industrial Workers of the World. Id. 
 5 Amani Sawari & Jared Ware, The Incarcerated Workers Org. Comm., Statement 
regarding the ongoing Nationwide Prison Strike, INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING 
COMMITTEE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://incarceratedworkers.org/news/strike-statement-press-au
gust-28-2018 [https://perma.cc/3FGM-MTA9]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. Similarly, the union in Jones sought to establish labor protections and effective 
grievance mechanisms in prison, among other demands. 433 U.S. at 119. While the demands 
of the prisoners in the 2018 strike encompass more than strictly “labor” conditions, many other 
past incarcerated worker labor unions have also focused on hybrid goals and sought broader 
protections. See Zonn, supra note 2, at 614. In part, this is because of the totality of the prison 
experience; prison labor conditions are inextricable from other elements of prison life. Like 
its predecessors, the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee identifies itself as a labor 
organization, although a number of the reforms that it called for through the 2018 strike were 
related to prison conditions more broadly. 
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This Comment examines the current legal landscape for incarcerated 
worker organizing and posits that while constitutional arguments for prisoner 
labor unions are not currently a viable option, labor law may provide some 
protections.  This premise follows in the footsteps of a recent article by Eric 
Fink8 and a Note by Kara Goad.9 Both authors have explored whether 
incarcerated worker unions might seek National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) certification as collective bargaining units.  However, given that the 
vast majority of prisoners—and incarcerated workers—are held in state 
prisons and work directly for the prison or the state, they would not fall under 
the mandate of the NLRB.10  As a result, incarcerated workers in such 
circumstances must look to state law in order to assert collective bargaining 
rights.  By receiving recognition at the state level and then demonstrating that 
labor organizing in the prison setting is not a threat to prison security, 
incarcerated worker unions may be able to build a body of evidence that 
could one day challenge Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion in Jones. 
Part I of this Comment discusses why prisoner labor organizing is an 
especially important and timely issue for advocates of criminal justice 
reform, racial justice, and labor rights. 
Part II explores the history of First Amendment freedom of association 
litigation surrounding incarcerated worker labor unions both before and after 
Jones and examines how the decision has impacted modern efforts to 
organize prison labor. 
Part III examines the statutory protections that may apply to 
incarcerated workers under the NLRA.  In order to unpack the threshold issue 
of whether prisoners are included in the statute’s definition of “employee,” 
this Comment reviews a number of cases brought by inmates under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a statute with a similar definition of the term, 
which was passed contemporaneously with the NLRA. 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the applicability of state statutes governing 
public employees’ collective bargaining rights to incarcerated workers.  Most 
recent scholarship on incarcerated worker labor organizing focuses on the 
viability of claims under the NLRA but acknowledges that even successful 
claims will only apply to a fraction of inmates who work in private industries.  
This Comment suggests that in order to build a successful movement and win 
protections for a larger number of incarcerated workers, those workers must 
seek recognition as public employees at the state level in states with robust 
 
 8 Eric M. Fink, Union Organizing & Collective Bargaining for Incarcerated Workers, 52 
IDAHO L. REV. 953 (2016). 
 9 Kara Goad, Note, Columbia University and Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions Under 
the National Labor Relations Act, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 177 (2017). 
 10 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63). 
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collective bargaining statutes.  To that end, this Comment identifies which 
states have public sector collective bargaining statutes that could conceivably 
include prisoners and examines past decisions by state employment relations 
boards that denied labor protections to prisoners.  This will clarify the 
challenges that incarcerated worker labor unions may face and shed new light 
on how to confront them. 
I. THE GROWING NEED FOR REFORM 
Concerns about prison labor have become a central issue in national 
conversations around criminal justice.  Shortly before the start of the 2018 
prison strike, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
tweeted, “Today, more than 2,000 volunteer inmate firefighters, including 58 
youth offenders, are battling wildfire flames throughout CA.  Inmate 
firefighters serve a vital role, clearing thick brush down to the bare soil to 
stop the fire’s spread.”11  Further reporting revealed that these inmate 
firefighters were only paid two dollars per day, plus one dollar per hour, for 
this grueling and dangerous work.12  During a harsh winter storm in Chicago, 
a photo posted to social media showing inmates shoveling snow “with no real 
winter gear” went viral.13  The Cook County Sheriff’s Office later issued a 
statement that the people in the photo had, in fact, been provided with 
insulated jumpsuits, gloves, hats, and boots, though they were still working 
outdoors in inhospitable conditions.14  When Senator Kamala Harris 
announced her candidacy for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination, 
journalists quickly uncovered a brief filed by the California Attorney 
General’s office in 2014, then led by Harris, which argued against reducing 
California’s prison population because it would shrink the state’s pool of 
cheap labor.15 
 
 11 CA Corrections (@CACorrections), TWITTER (July 31, 2018, 6:40 PM), https://twitter.
com/cacorrections/status/1024439641221419008?s=21 [https://perma.cc/55Q8-T7XS]. 
 12 See, e.g., Abigail Hess, California is Paying Inmates $1 an Hour to Fight Wildfires, 
CNBC (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/14/california-is-paying-inmates-1-an
-hour-to-fight-wildfires.html [https://perma.cc/9T9W-RBEG]. Despite the experience that 
these inmate firefighters gain in the field, their criminal history generally bars them from 
finding employment as a firefighter upon release. Id. 
 13 Morgan Greene, Viral Photo of Cook County Jail Inmates Shoveling Sparks Backlash, 
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-cook
-county-jail-inmates-shoveling-cold-photo-20190129-story.html [https://perma.cc/2Q5W-9R
E7]. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Kate Zernike, ‘Progressive Prosecutor’: Can Kamala Harris Square the Circle?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/11/us/kamala-harris-progressive-p
rosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/9R77-8FA3]. Senator Harris stated that she was unaware of 
the brief. Id. 
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Advocates for criminal justice reform have many reasons to be 
concerned about prison labor.  First, incarcerated workers have few legal 
rights or labor protections possessed by their non-incarcerated counterparts.16  
As of 2016, approximately 188,400 people were incarcerated in federal 
prisons, and state prisons held another 1,228,800 individuals.17  This puts a 
large number of people at risk of extreme exploitation.  While the Department 
of Justice has not published its Census of State and Federal Correctional 
Facilities since 2005, the findings of that year’s census show that nearly fifty-
four percent of all inmates (state and federal) were held in facilities that 
operated work programs and that ninety-eight percent of federal inmates 
were held in facilities with work programs.18  Federal law requires federal 
inmates to work if they are medically able,19 and many states have similar 
policies.20  Some states pay incarcerated workers for their labor, while others, 
such as Texas, which has the largest state prison population in the United 
States, do not.21  Even where prisoners are paid, they “work under unusually 
intense conditions for unusually low wages.”22  This has led many to 
characterize prison labor as “modern-day slavery”23 or as a form of 
“superexploitation.”24 
Second, prison labor is an issue of racial justice.  Prison labor in North 
America has its roots in seventeenth-century Pennsylvania and expanded 
over the course of the nineteenth century under the theory that labor could 
lead to moral reform,25 but it took on strong racial undertones following the 
 
 16 Fink, supra note 8, at 955. 
 17 DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BJS BULL. NO. NCJ 251211, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2016 12 (2018). 
 18 JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005 5 (2008). 
 19 WORK PROGRAMS, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custodyand
_care/work_programs.jsp [https://perma.cc/P8R2-L2TS] (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).]. 
 20 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148–26 (2017). 
 21 Jason Renard Walker, Unpaid Labor in Texas Prisons Is Modern-Day Slavery, 
TRUTHOUT (Sept. 6, 2016), https://truthout.org/articles/unpaid-labor-in-texas-prisons-is-mode
rn-day-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/L82U-JT5M]. 
 22 Fink, supra note 8, at 964. 
 23 Walker, supra note 21. 
 24 Fink, supra note 8, at 963. The concept of “superexploitation” originated in Marxist 
theory, but also has a broader definition reflecting a population working under intense 
conditions for extraordinarily low wages, facing extreme social exclusion, and experiencing a 
long-term state of subordination. Id. at 963–64. 
 25 Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 347–50 (1998). 
In William Penn’s 1682 Frame of Government for Pennsylvania, he wrote, “all prisons shall 
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Civil War.26  The Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, 
infamously created an exception in the case of prison labor: “Neither slavery 
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction.”27  As the post-war Reconstruction Era 
came to an abrupt end, many Southern states exploited this exception by 
enacting vagrancy statutes, which made it a criminal offense not to work.28  
These laws were selectively applied to African Americans, allowing a form 
of racial hierarchy and labor exploitation to continue after slavery’s 
abolishment.29 
During the Jim Crow era, vagrancy laws expanded and labor conditions 
deteriorated as Southern states contracted out convicts to private entities.30  
In her landmark examination of mass incarceration, The New Jim Crow, 
Michelle Alexander writes, “Death rates were shockingly high, for the 
private contractors had no interest in the health and well-being of their 
laborers, unlike the earlier slave-owners who needed their slaves, at a 
minimum, to be healthy enough to survive hard labor.”31  The context of 
prison labor has changed over the years, but minorities remain 
overrepresented in the prison system, and as a result, in the prison labor 
pool.32 
Third, prison labor is—as the term suggests—a labor issue.  Some 
contemporary progressive commentators argue that unions should take a 
proactive stance in support of incarcerated workers in the name of defending 
working class interests beyond the narrower interests of any individual 
 
be work-houses, for felons, vagrants, and loose and idle persons.” William Penn, Frame of 
Government of Pennsylvania, The Avalon Project, YALE LAW SCHOOL LILLIAN GOLDMAN 
LAW LIBRARY (2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/pa04.asp [https://perma.cc/F
CG3-WXM9]. After the American Revolution, Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Jail served as an 
early experiment in the modern penitentiary, with prisoners producing goods for private 
contractors, while supervised by the state. Garvey at 349. Prison labor expanded in the early 
1800s, with the establishment of New York’s Auburn Prison and Pennsylvania’s Cherry Hill 
Prison. Id. at 349–50. 
 26 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 28 (rev. ed. 2010). 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 28 ALEXANDER, supra note 26, at 28. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 31. 
 31 Id. 
 32 The NAACP estimates that African Americans are incarcerated at a rate five times 
greater than the rate at which whites are incarcerated. NAACP, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FACT 
SHEET, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/2XFK-QN7B]. 
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union’s members.33  However, the historical relationship between 
incarcerated workers and labor unions has been much more fraught and 
complicated.  There have been two primary reasons why labor unions have 
taken a stand against prison labor.  At first, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
unions distanced themselves from prison labor because of “the need to 
preserve the dignity of free labor.” 34  Later, unions objected to the “economic 
menace of prison labor” as prison industries became more profitable and 
posed a competitive threat to organized labor outside prison walls.35  This 
threat led unions to call for reforms to prison labor around the turn of the 
twentieth century, including paying prisoners the prevailing wage, limiting 
the number of hours inmates could work, and banning prison-made goods 
from entering inter-state commerce.36  Though labor unions called for prison 
labor reform out of their own self-interest, their advocacy sometimes 
simultaneously helped advance prisoners’ interests.37  However, apart from 
the Industrial Workers of the World’s (“IWW”) Incarcerated Workers 
Organizing Committee, which helped organize the 2018 prison strike,38 there 
is little evidence of the broader labor movement taking up the cause of prison 
labor in recent years. 
Based on these three issues—concerns about mass exploitation, racial 
justice, and labor rights—advocates from many sectors have good reason to 
support prisoner labor organizing.  After all, prisoner-led organizing, both 
within and outside of the labor context, has an impressive track record.  For 
 
 33 See James Kilgore, Mass Incarceration and Working Class Interests: Which Side Are 
the Unions On?, 34 LAB. STUD. J. 356, 357 (2013). 
 34 Garvey, supra note 25, at 359. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 361–62. 
 37 Recent cases continue to highlight the complicated relationship between labor unions 
and incarcerated labor. In Washington Water Jet Workers Association v. Yarbrough, an 
association of workers using water jet cutting technology sued a company that contracted 
prison labor to do similar work. 90 P.3d 42 (Wash. 2004). A persistent challenge for linking 
prison labor concerns to the broader labor movement has been the power of correctional 
officers unions, which have resisted calls for prison reform. See Mike Elk, The Next Step for 
Organized Labor? People in Prison, THE NATION (July 11, 2016), https://www.thenation.co
m/article/the-next-step-for-organized-labor-people-in-prison/ [https://perma.cc/6F76-NCB2]; 
James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Big Labor’s Lock ‘Em Up Mentality, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 
22, 2013), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/biggest-obstacle-prison-reform-
labor-unions/ [https://perma.cc/2U88-4GNJ]. Some are more optimistic about the prospects 
of uniting correctional officer unions with the interests of prisoners, at least in limited 
circumstances. See Austin McCoy, Prison Guard Unions and Mass Incarceration: Prospects 
for an Improbable Alliance, 26 NEW LAB. F. 74, 79 (2017) (“[P]rivatization has at times served 
as fertile ground for prison worker and inmate solidarity, as . . . in the case of privatized food 
service [in Ohio prisons].”). 
 38 See Sawari & Ware, supra note 5. 
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example, prisoner movements played a crucial role in convincing the 
Supreme Court to recognize that prisoners had any legal rights whatsoever.39  
Despite implicating numerous constitutional issues, the Supreme Court 
rarely addressed issues concerning prisoners’ rights for nearly two 
centuries.40  Then, in the early 1960s, courts began to show an increased 
willingness to weigh in on prisoners’ constitutional rights, due in large part 
to the growing prisoner rights movement.41  As noted by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights and the National Lawyers’ Guild, “[P]risoners did not 
begin to win many important court decisions until the prison movement grew 
strong.”42 
Following the Attica Prison Uprising of 1971, the prisoners’ rights 
movement “evolved into three primary branches: a prison abolitionist 
movement . . . ; a prison union movement that attempted to deliver the tactics 
of labor mobilization behind bars; and a legal, civil rights, and social struggle 
over prison overcrowding and the denial of prisoners’ rights.”43  Each branch 
brought its own set of court cases, with the prisoner labor union movement 
seeing some hopeful signs from the courts between 1972 and 1977.44 
In 1977, though, Jones dashed these hopes.  The decision signaled the 
end of an era in which the Supreme Court had taken a few modest steps to 
expand the protection of prisoners’ First Amendment rights.45  Writing for 
the Court in Jones, Justice Rehnquist said that prisoners’ freedom of 
association “must give way to the reasonable considerations of penal 
management.”46  If prison administrators felt that a prisoner labor union 
 
 39 Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 59 FED. PROB. 36, 36 (1995). 
 40 See id. This hands-off approach stemmed from concerns about separation of powers, 
the Court’s lack of expertise in matters related to prison administration, and federalism. Id. 
 41 Id. Another reason that the 1960s saw an increasing number of cases brought by 
prisoners was a reinterpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, which determined 
that § 1983 was intended to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights by 
officials’ abuse of their respective positions. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). This opened the door 
for prisoners to bring claims in court that would not have been previously heard, and forms 
the backbone of much modern prison litigation. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION 15 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d ed. 2014); THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
& THE NATIONAL LAWYERS’ GUILD, THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S HANDBOOK 5 (Rachel 
Meeropol & Ian Head eds., 5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter Jailhouse Lawyer’s Handbook]. 
 42 Jailhouse Lawyer’s Handbook, supra note 41, at 5. 
 43 Robert T. Chase, We Are Not Slaves: Rethinking the Rise of Carceral States through 
the Lens of the Prisoners’ Rights Movement, 102 J. AM. HIST. 73, 75–76 (2015). 
 44 This string of cases will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.A., infra. 
 45 Bradley B. Falkof, Comment, Prisoner Representative Organizations, Prison Reform, 
and Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union: An Argument for Increased Court 
Intervention in Prison Administration, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 42, 50 (1979). 
 46 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977). 
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would be a threat, they were constitutionally permitted to take reasonable 
steps to forestall that threat, including barring the union from meeting or 
recruiting members or prohibiting bulk mailings from the union.47  This 
decision essentially halted litigation around incarcerated workers’ labor 
unions. 
In the years since Jones, prison labor has both increased and changed 
form, beginning with the PIE Act of 1979, which allows some firms to sell 
prisoner-made goods on the open market.48  Since the enactment of the PIE 
Act, more private enterprises have begun to use prison labor.49 In addition to 
working for private industries, inmates still work in more traditional jobs 
within prisons, such as food service, maintenance, and making road signs and 
license plates. 
Presently, incarcerated people face many risks for organizing behind 
bars, an act which mostly takes place covertly as a matter of necessity.  For 
instance, they may be put on a Security Threat Group list that could 
negatively impact their chance of early release or parole.50  Reprisals against 
prisoners who organize reflect a fear on the part of prison administrators that 
prison organizing may lead—or be connected—to violence.  Indeed, in 
Jones, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that prisoner unions would 
disrupt “prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the prison environment.”51  In the years following 
the decision, the perception of prisons as hotbeds of violent gang activity has 
only grown.52  However, some scholars have noted that incarcerated worker 
unions can provide a constructive outlet for prisoners to express grievances 
and may lead to correctional and rehabilitative benefits.53  Indeed, countries 
such as Denmark and Sweden permit inmate unions, and union activity there 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–157, § 827, 93 Stat. 1167 
(1979) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1761). Prior to the enactment of the PIE Act, the 
Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929 and the Ashurst-Sumners Act of 1935 had barred private 
companies from using prison labor and from allowing states to profit from the interstate sale 
of prison-made goods. Garvey, supra note 25, at 366. 
 49 Garvey, supra note 25, at 372. 
 50 Organizing the Prisoner Class: An Interview with IWOC, IT’S GOING DOWN (Apr. 30, 
2016), https://itsgoingdown.org/organizing-prisoner-class-interview-iwoc/ [https://perma.cc/
HDG2-M5VX]. 
 51 Jones, 433 U.S. at 132. 
 52 See Graeme Wood, How Gangs Took Over Prisons, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/10/how-gangs-took-over-prisons/37933
0/ [https://perma.cc/WE9S-XTKH]. 
 53 See, e.g., Luis Jorge DeGraffe, Prisoners’ Unions: A Potential Contribution to the 
Rehabilitation of the Incarcerated, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 221, 233–
34 (1990). 
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has been linked to lower rates of recidivism.54  However, it will be difficult 
for prisoners in the United States to make a case for the rehabilitative benefits 
of organizing.  After Jones, incarcerated workers seeking to organize face a 
catch-22: they will be hard-pressed to show that their unions do not pose a 
threat to prison stability and security unless they are first permitted to 
organize.55 
II. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION FOR INCARCERATED WORKERS 
A. THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION REGARDING 
INCARCERATED WORKER LABOR UNIONS 
Inmates in California established the first modern incarcerated worker 
labor union in 1970 following strikes at Soledad Prison and Folsom Prison.56  
These strikes coalesced into the United Prisoners’ Union, an association of 
California prisoners that focused on a wide range of issues including 
indeterminate sentences, worker’s compensation, minimum wage, parole 
board policy, and medical care.57  The movement spread, and by 1972, three 
groups in California worked to form local prisoner unions while other groups 
took root in New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.58 
As the prisoner labor union movement gained momentum in the early 
1970s, some federal courts seemed poised to accept that these unions should 
be afforded constitutional protections.  However, the proposed standards for 
freedom of association afforded to these unions varied from court to court. 
One early district court case, National Prisoners Reform Association v. 
Sharkey, provided injunctive relief to a group of prisoners whose warden had 
blocked them from forming an association.59  In its decision, the court wrote, 
“There is a high probability that, on the merits, it will be found that there is 
a First Amendment right to associate . . . for the reasons that plaintiff has 
organized,” including improving prison conditions.60  Balanced against this 
potential First Amendment right, the court found that the defendant prison 
warden had not “come near to presenting that minimum quantum of evidence 
needed to demonstrate the presence of an important government interest.”61  
Even at the lowest level of scrutiny, states must demonstrate that the disputed 
 
 54 Id. at 225. 
 55 Zonn, supra note 2, at 630. 
 56 Id. at 621. 
 57 Frank Browning, Organizing Behind Bars, 10 RAMPARTS 40, 43 (1972). 
 58 Id. at 42. 
 59 Nat’l Prisoners Reform Ass’n v. Sharkey, 347 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (D.R.I. 1972). 
 60 Id. at 1238. 
 61 Id. 
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conduct furthers a legitimate interest.62  In this case, the court found the 
prisoners’ constitutional interest more compelling than the government’s 
interest, especially since the defendant prison warden explicitly stated that he 
did not view the organization as a threat.63  The defendant did not appeal the 
decision, so no higher court ruled on the merits of the case. 
In Goodwin v. Oswald, a group of prisoners filed suit after prison 
officials intercepted letters between them and their lawyers discussing the 
foundation of a union.64  Despite the fact that the contents of the letters dealt 
with a union, Judge Smith, writing for the court, avoided ruling on the 
legality of such an organization: 
We are not faced on this appeal with the question of the constitutionality or legality of 
unions or other organizations of prisoners . . . . We do not therefore intimate any views 
as to the legality, desirability, dangers, or possible benefits of any type of prisoner 
collective bargaining on prison working conditions or of any other organized 
representation of prisoners.65 
Rather than ruling on prisoners’ freedom of association, the decision 
turned on the fact that the prison withheld letters sent by the prisoners’ 
lawyers, implicating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.66  The Second 
Circuit agreed with the trial court that “the letter was a communication of 
legal advice, not a call to illegal action, and that its optimism about the 
formation of a union was carefully hedged with cautionary instructions to 
obey all prison rules in the interim . . . .”67 Thus, as in Sharkey, the court 
avoided determining whether or not prisoners had a First Amendment 
freedom of association to form a union. 
Other district court decisions sought to balance the First Amendment 
rights of the prisoner against the state’s interest involved in restricting that 
right, following Pell v. Procunier.68 In this vein, the District Court of 
Connecticut applied the Pell balancing test in Paka v. Manson and found that 
 
 62 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1238–39 (2d. Cir. 1972). 
 65 Id. at 1239. 
 66 Id. at 1240. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (“[C]hallenges to prison restrictions that 
are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate 
policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been 
committed in accordance with due process of law.”). 
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the state had a compelling interest in restricting the activities of a prisoners’ 
union in the name of prison security.69 
Despite the lack of a definitive answer from a higher court about the 
constitutional protections afforded to incarcerated worker labor unions, these 
lower court cases—and other contemporary First Amendment prison cases 
heard by the Supreme Court, such as Procunier v. Martinez70—signaled that 
federal courts might apply more exacting scrutiny to some First Amendment 
rights of prisoners, including freedom of association.  However, Jones 
deviated from this trend by dramatically curtailing prisoners’ freedom of 
association. 
B. JONES AND ITS CHILLING EFFECT ON PRISONER LABOR 
UNIONS 
In Jones, a group of inmates formed a labor union which sought to 
improve working conditions in a North Carolina prison through collective 
bargaining.71  The union also hoped to serve as a mechanism to address 
broader inmate grievances.72  However, the prison administration adopted 
policies barring the union from meeting, both declining to deliver bulk 
mailings of union publications and preventing inmates in the union from 
recruiting new members.73  A week before these regulations were set to take 
effect, the union sued, claiming that the prison’s actions violated its 
members’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.74 
The district court found in favor of the union, but the Supreme Court 
overturned this ruling.75 The Court reasoned, based on Pell, that inmates do 
not possess those First Amendment rights that are supposedly “‘inconsistent 
 
 69 Paka v. Manson, 387 F. Supp. 111, 122 (D. Conn. 1974). Zonn notes that this decision 
had “aggravating circumstances which weighed heavily in favor of the State’s interest,” 
including the fact that one of the organizers of the union was found to be in possession of a 
letter describing a fictitious violent incident, which may have threatened the internal security 
of the prison. Zonn, supra note 2, at 626 n.90. 
 70 See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413–14 (1974) (finding that restrictions 
on censoring prisoners’ mail by imposing restrictions upon prisoners’ mailing rights are 
justified if the practice furthers an “important or substantial governmental interest unrelated 
to the suppression of expression,” and if the limitations on First Amendment freedoms are no 
greater than necessary to protect the governmental interest). 
 71 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 122 (1977). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 121. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 136. 
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with [their] status as a prisoner . . . .”76 Justice Rehnquist wrote for the 
majority: 
[N]umerous associational rights are necessarily curtailed by the realities of 
confinement. They may be curtailed whenever the institution’s officials, in the exercise 
of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations . . . possess the 
likelihood of disruption to prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the 
legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment.77 
To the Court, the fact that the union wanted to present grievances to the 
administration and engage in adversarial collective bargaining provided 
sufficient grounds for barring its activity so long as the prison officials felt 
that these activities threatened prison security.78  Under this decision, then, 
prison systems can promulgate policies prohibiting union organizing. 
Jones determined that the First Amendment did not protect prisoner 
labor unions, but it did not formally ban them either.  Chief Justice Burger 
clarified this point in his concurrence, writing, “In determining [that the 
Constitution permits prison officials to prevent unions from organizing], we 
do not suggest that prison officials could not or should not permit such inmate 
organizations, but only that the Constitution does not require them to do 
so.”79  Thus, while Jones has effectively resulted in the widespread 
elimination of incarcerated worker unions, it leaves a door open for groups 
like the IWOC who wish to pick up the mantle of inmate labor organizing 
today.80  Unions may still operate where permitted, and groups of prisoners 
may still find ways to persuade prison officials that organizing to present 
grievances is a worthwhile goal and not counter to penological or 
rehabilitative goals. 
The Jones decision was understandably viewed as a backslide on the 
modest expansion of prisoners’ rights started in Martinez81 (though Jones 
 
 76 Id. at 129 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 
 77 Id. at 132. 
 78 Id. at 133. 
 79 Id. at 137 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 80 Indeed, in addition to its more clandestine efforts in organizing the 2018 prison strike, 
a group of prisoners affiliated with the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee (IWOC) 
has filed with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to officially become the Incarcerated 
Workers Industrial Union 613, a branch of the IWW. IWOC, First Incarcerated Worker 
Industrial Union Branch Forming, IT’S GOING DOWN (Jan. 18, 2018), https://itsgoingdown.o
rg/first-incarcerated-worker-industrial-union-branch-forming/ [https://perma.cc/7MRN-Y6R
6]. There have been no subsequent updates since the January 2018 announcement. The author 
has contacted several local IWW chapters, as well as the national organization, in order to 
learn more about this effort, but has not received further information about the Incarcerated 
Workers Industrial Union 613. 
 81 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413–14 (1974). 
2020] COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 607 
approvingly cited Martinez).82  Justice Rehnquist did not engage in the 
Martinez analysis, which would have required the Court to examine whether 
less restrictive limitations might be possible for any given restriction on 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights.83  He also did not examine Jones under 
various other standards that could have been applied, “such as a clear and 
present danger test [or a] compelling state interest test . . . . Instead, the Court 
applied the less exacting standard of a rational basis test,” as noted by Sidney 
Zonn, who appraised the impact and significance of Jones in 1978.84  This 
less exacting standard ultimately had a chilling effect on prisoners’ unions. 
C. PRISONERS’ UNION LITIGATION AFTER JONES 
A number of cases at the state and federal levels in the years after Jones 
reflect the damage this case caused to First Amendment freedom of 
association litigation over prison labor organizing.  On the heels of Jones, the 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida issued its decision in Brooks 
v. Wainwright.85  Brooks went even further than Jones, not only arguing that 
prison administrators could limit prisoners’ freedom of association, but 
essentially saying that prisoners had no freedom of association whatsoever.86 
Slightly more encouragingly, the California Supreme Court weighed in 
on an attempted prisoner union at Soledad Prison in In re Price.87  While the 
decision cited Jones, reasoning that the wardens had not violated any 
constitutional right in restricting the union’s activity,88 the case hinged on the 
potentially more generous California Penal Code Section 2600, which states, 
“A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison . . . may during that 
period of confinement be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as 
 
 82 See, e.g., Falkof, supra note 45, at 47; Zonn, supra note 2, at 630. 
 83 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 420. 
 84 Zonn, supra note 2, at 628. 
 85 Brooks v. Wainwright, 439 F. Supp. 1335 (M.D. Fla. 1977). Interestingly, this case 
concerned one of the lead organizers of the prison union from Jones, Wayne Brooks, who 
attempted to organize another prisoners’ union after being transferred to a prison in Florida. 
Id. at 1336. This case is also notable because Brooks enlisted the United Hotel, Motel and 
Lounge Employees Union as an intervenor to argue that prisoners qualified as public 
employees. Id. at 1337. However, the court found that Florida state law expressly bars state 
inmates from the definition of public employees. Id. at 1339. 
 86 Id. at 1340 (“[O]ne of the first and most basic freedoms that inmates relinquish is the 
freedom of association. Were it not so, incarceration would be meaningless and impossible, 
since prisoners could come and go as they pleased under the guise of exercising the First 
Amendment liberty to association with whom they wished.”). 
 87 In re Price, 600 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1979). 
 88 Id. at 1332. 
608 ARMSTRONG [Vol. 110 
[are] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”89  The court 
found that the prison administrators had legitimate security concerns in mind 
when they barred the prisoners’ union from meeting.90  However, the court 
wrote, “[O]ur conclusion is not carved in stone and should not be interpreted 
as a permanent prohibition against reasonable prisoner activities proposed by 
the union.”91  This indicates that, despite a lack of constitutional protections 
from federal courts, prisoner unions may successfully litigate in some state 
courts under the right conditions.92 
A 1993 case, Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, provides the final 
word at the federal level on the scope of prisoners’ rights to association.93  In 
Rowland, a prisoners’ organization sanctioned by the warden attempted to 
sue the warden in forma pauperis in response to changes to prison policy.94 
Litigation in forma pauperis permits an indigent plaintiff to initiate a lawsuit 
without prepaying filing fees or other court costs.95  The Supreme Court held 
that only natural persons may qualify for treatment in forma pauperis.96  
While this case concerned prisoners’ rights to association, its holding was 
based on statutory, not constitutional, rights.97  As a result, the Court did not 
directly follow (or even cite) Jones.  However, Rowland indicates that the 
Supreme Court has continued to view prisoners’ freedom of association 
unfavorably, even outside of the constitutional context, in the decades after 
Jones. 
 
 89 CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 2012). This statute can be interpreted similarly to the 
tests enacted in Pell and Martinez. The California Supreme Court has also interpreted this 
statute to permit inmates to wear lapel pins representing prisoners’ unions, unless the Director 
of Corrections can cite “past disruption caused by acquiring and wearing Union buttons” or 
“specific reasons for predicting disruptions.” In re Reynolds, 599 P.2d 86, 88 (Cal. 1979). 
While the prison may bar union meetings, it may not bar the expressive act of wearing a pin 
or a badge. Id. 
 90 In re Price, 600 P.2d at 1333. It is also worth noting that this case was not tried on the 
basis of any state or federal labor law. As discussed in Sections III and IV, infra, even in the 
absence of associational rights, labor law may provide an avenue for incarcerated workers to 
gain labor protections. 
 91 Id. 
 92 In Section IV, infra, I survey different state laws about whether prisoners may be 
considered public Employees. It would be an interesting future project to survey different state 
constitutional rights to freedom of association vis-à-vis prisoners’ unions. However, this is 
beyond the scope of the argument presented in this piece. 
 93 Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 
 94 Id. at 196–97. 
 95 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2019). 
 96 Rowland, 506 U.S. at 197. 
 97 Id. at 211. 
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Following these discouraging post-Jones cases in which prisoners found 
no constitutional protections for their organizing, litigation around prisoners’ 
unions ceased entirely.  No subsequent court case has challenged the core 
holding of Jones. 
D. CONTEMPORARY EFFORTS AT PRISONER UNIONIZATION: THE 
INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE AND 
THE NATIONWIDE PRISON STRIKE 
Although Jones effectively stalled further litigation on constitutional 
protections for prison labor unions, prisoner organizing has continued, as 
demonstrated by the 2018 prison strike, its predecessor in 2016, and a major 
2013 prisoner hunger strike in California involving nearly 30,000 inmates.98 
The Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee (IWOC), the entity 
behind the 2016 and 2018 strikes, is a committee within the IWW that helps 
support incarcerated people with self-organizing efforts.99  It seeks to 
“directly challenge prison slavery, work conditions, and the system itself: 
break cycles of criminalization, exploitation, and the state-sponsored 
divisions of our working class.”100  In addition to organizing strikes and 
advocating on behalf of prison labor, it makes use of other forms of protest 
such as work stoppages and hunger strikes.101  These efforts have the 
potential to create operational disruptions to the industries within prisons that 
rely on prison labor.102  Because of the liminal status of prisoners—and the 
ways in which they do not fall within traditional labor power dynamics—
they must resort to these varied tactics in order to seek to assert their rights. 
The IWOC is not IWW’s first attempt at organizing prisoners.  In 1987, 
the IWW initiated its Prison Organizing Project, which sought to represent 
400 Ohio inmates in collective bargaining.103  In this early attempt at post-
Jones prisoner organizing, the Ohio State Employment Relations Board 
refused to recognize the prisoners as public employees, and the effort 
 
 98 Rory Carroll, California Prisoners Launch Biggest Hunger Strike in State’s History, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 9, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/09/california-
prisoners-hunger-strike [https://perma.cc/2WB3-9MMP]. 
 99 Organizing the Prisoner Class: An Interview with the IWOC, supra note 50. 
 100 IWOC Preamble, INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, https://incarcer
atedworkers.org/iwoc-preamble [https://perma.cc/D5CL-ZWZG]. 
 101 About, INCARCERATED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, https://incarceratedworker
s.org/about [https://perma.cc/4GY2-2CKL]. 
 102 Laignee Barron, Here’s Why Inmates in the U.S. Prison System Have Launched a 
Nationwide Prison Strike, TIME (Aug. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5374133/prison-strike-labo
r-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/LVK3-2MUV]. 
 103 IWW Chronology (1984-1989), INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, https://iww.org/
about/chronology/9 [https://perma.cc/6XXN-DH7N]. 
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failed.104  Unlike this early effort, the IWOC is not seeking formal union 
recognition at present; rather, the IWW facilitates various organizing efforts 
behind bars.105 
Because of the limits imposed on prisoners’ freedom of association in 
Jones, IWOC members have resorted to creative and informal methods to 
recruit members and gather support for their strike.  To recruit members, 
IWW members have combed through prison databases and sent inmates 
unsolicited letters.106  This need for direct outreach is a result of Jones’ 
holding concerning bulk mail: as long as other methods of outreach are 
available, prohibitions on bulk mailings from unions do not violate First 
Amendment rights.107  Similarly, incarcerated IWOC members have mostly 
relied on word of mouth to share information about the prison strike.108 
Though Jones limited prisoner labor unions’ options in court, prison 
labor organizing has persevered and come to new prominence, though 
organizers have had to shift their tactics. 
III. FEDERAL STATUTORY LABOR PROTECTIONS FOR 
INCARCERATED WORKERS 
A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
Although Jones found that prisoners had no constitutionally protected 
First Amendment right to association, a federal labor statute may provide 
protections to certain categories of incarcerated workers, including a 
statutory right to unionize.  Some have hypothesized that incarcerated 
workers may be protected under the NLRA.109  As noted by Eric M. Fink, 
one of the first legal scholars to address incarcerated worker unions in a law 
review article since the late 1970s, “The significance of Jones lies more in 
 
 104 Id. Discussed in greater detail in Part IV.C., infra. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Cheryl Corley, U.S. Inmates Plan Nationwide Prison Strike to Protest Labor 
Conditions, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED: NPR (Aug. 21, 2018, 6:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2
018/08/21/640630606/u-s-inmates-plan-nationwide-prison-strike-to-protest-labor-conditions 
[https://perma.cc/RZ93-JFPJ]. Immediately following Jones, a law review publication noted, 
“The Court did not decide whether prison administrators could extend the ban on union mail 
to cover individual mailings from outside organizers to individual inmates.” Regina Montoya 
& Paul Coggins, Case Comment, The Future of Prisoners’ Unions: Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners’ Labor Union, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 799, 825 (1978). There has been no 
subsequent litigation on this specific issue, but it appears that in at least some states, direct 
mailing has proven to be an effective outreach tactic. 
 107 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 130 (1977). 
 108 Corley, supra note 106. 
 109 Fink, supra note 8, at 966. 
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what the Court did not decide.  The majority did not hold that [the Union’s] 
members were not statutory employees.”110 
If workers are found to be statutory employees under the NLRA, they 
“shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing.”111  However, while federal courts have determined that 
inmates on work release programs may be included in a class of statutory 
employees alongside non-incarcerated peers in identical jobs, and as a result 
engage in collective bargaining,112 federal courts have never determined 
whether incarcerated workers in prison industries are statutory employees.113 
The NLRA’s definition of employee is expansive: “The term 
‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the limited 
to the employees of a particular employer . . . .”114  The NLRA, however, 
does not cover public employers or employees.115  As a result, any analysis 
of whether incarcerated workers may be covered under the NLRA has 
focused on those inmates employed either in private industries in private 
prisons116 or in the PIE program.117 
Though the NLRA is silent on whether incarcerated workers may be 
considered statutory employees, a number of federal cases have examined 
the circumstances under which incarcerated workers may be considered 
employees under the FLSA, which includes a number of labor protections 
including minimum wage requirements.  As noted by Kara Goad, the FLSA 
uses a similar definition of “employee” as the NLRA and is thus useful for 
understanding the circumstances under which incarcerated workers may be 
considered to be statutory employees.118 
 
 110 Id. at 972. This issue did not arise in Jones because North Carolina law bars collective 
bargaining by state employees, and all the prisoners in the union were employed solely in 
prison operations. Id. 
 111 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63). 
 112 Speedrack Prods. Grp. v. N.L.R.B., 114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 113 Goad, supra note 9, at 187. 
 114 29 U.S.C. § 152 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63). 
 115 Id. § 152(2). 
 116 See Goad, supra note 9, at 197. 
 117 See Fink, supra note 8, at 968–69. 
 118 Goad, supra note 9, at 188. The Fair Labor Standards Act defines an employee for 
most purposes as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2009) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-63). 
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B. PRISONERS AS STATUTORY EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FLSA 
Until the 1980s, most courts did not find inmates to be employees under 
the FLSA.119  Claims by incarcerated workers against the private entities for 
which they worked were generally dismissed due to a lack of “control” on 
the part of the private entity.120  However, beginning with Carter v. Dutchess 
Community College,121 several circuits reversed summary judgment and 
motions to dismiss, finding that inmates were not excluded as a class from 
FLSA protections.  The court in Carter wrote, “We believe that courts should 
refrain from exempting a whole class of workers, based on technical labels, 
from the coverage of the FLSA . . . .”122  As a result of this holding, prisoners 
are not expressly excluded from FLSA coverage.123  Rather, a court must 
consider “how many typical employer prerogatives are exercised over the 
inmate by the outside employer, and to what extent.”124  This indicates a 
broadening of the ways courts may be willing to examine prospective 
employer-employee relationships for control. 
The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Watson v. Graves, a 
case in which a Louisiana sheriff hired out prisoners to local companies for 
twenty dollars per day.125  One local company kept the prisoners out for 
extended shifts and did not adequately compensate them for the additional 
time, among other labor abuses.126  The court cited Carter, finding that 
inmate status does not per se prevent inquiry into FLSA coverage.127  
However, in this case, the court went a step further: not only did it reverse 
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, it actually rendered judgment 
in favor of the inmates on their FLSA claims due to the egregiousness of the 
violation, and only remanded in part so that the district court could calculate 
how much the inmates were owed under the FLSA.128  Applying the 
“economic realities test” established in Goldberg v. Whitaker House 
Cooperative, Inc.129, which requires an examination of the substantive 
realities of the relationship between two parties, rather than resorting to 
 
 119 Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic 
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 872 (2008). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 122 Id. at 13. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 14. 
 125 Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 126 Id. at 1551. 
 127 Id. at 1554. 
 128 Id. at 1550. 
 129 Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961). 
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“mere forms or labels,” in order to determine whether an employee is 
protected by the FLSA, the court found the inmates to be employees.130  They 
were entirely unsupervised by prison officials over the course of their 
employment, and the private company dictated their work schedules.131 
In Hale v. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit examined whether Arizona 
inmates working in the state prison enterprise, ARCOR, could be considered 
employees under the FLSA.132  The court found that in the years since Carter, 
Congress had amended the FLSA twice and did not explicitly exempt 
prisoners from the Act’s coverage either time.133  The court interpreted this 
silence as evidence of congressional intent not to categorically exclude 
prisoners—even those working within prison walls, but for a private 
employer.134  However, the court found that the FLSA’s obligations did not 
apply to the appellees in this case because of the employment program in 
question.135  ARCOR was explicitly structured to meet the state requirement 
that inmates perform “hard labor” as a form of punishment, and prisoners 
working in the program did so for penological purposes.136  Because of this, 
the court did not discuss which types of prison labor might affirmatively 
constitute employment. 
Ultimately, these cases reinforce the fact that incarcerated workers are 
not excluded from federal labor protections.  They may, in fact, be considered 
statutory employees when working for private companies that exercise 
control over various aspects of their employment, pursuant to other state 
statutory requirements.  Based on this, it may similarly be possible for the 
NLRB to consider incarcerated workers to be statutory employees in certain 
circumstances. 
For a brief period of time, it appeared that the NLRB was increasingly 
disposed to consider unconventional work relationships to be employment 
for the purpose of union recognition.  In a 2017 Comment, Kara Goad wrote 
that reasoning of the 2016 NLRB decision in Columbia University, which 
held that graduate student assistants were employees under the NLRA, could 
potentially also encompass incarcerated workers. 137  In Columbia University, 
the NLRB found that the only economic component necessary to establish an 
 
 130 Watson, 909 F.2d at 1554. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 133 Id. at 1392 n.8. 
 134 Id. at 1392–93 n.8. 
 135 Id. at 1398. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Goad, supra note 9. 
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employment relationship is payment on the part of the employer.138  Goad 
wrote of the decision, “[A]s long as there is an employment relationship, the 
existence of some other relationship not covered by the Act does not prevent 
an individual from being protected as an employee.”139  While the dual role 
examined in Columbia University was student/employee, an extension of this 
reasoning could have permitted incarcerated worker unions to argue that their 
relationship with correctional institutions also served a dual role: part 
rehabilitative/penological and part employment.140  This would have been a 
promising avenue for incarcerated workers unions to pursue. 
However, in September 2019, the NLRB proposed a new rule 
overturning Columbia University, declaring that graduate student employees’ 
relationship with their universities is “primarily educational” rather than 
economic.141  The comment period for the new rule ended on January 15, 
2020, and parties had an additional two weeks to respond to comments.142  If 
this new rule takes effect, it would weaken the case that incarcerated workers 
should be allowed to unionize due to their dual role as inmates and workers.  
As a result, it appears that a brief window of opportunity is closing. 
IV. STATE PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR PROTECTIONS FOR 
INCARCERATED WORKERS 
A. STATE AND LOCAL-LEVEL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: WORTH 
ANOTHER LOOK 
As mentioned in the previous section, a favorable finding by the NLRB 
would likely apply to prisoners employed in private industries in privately-
operated prisons, and possibly those involved in the PIE program.  However, 
the vast majority of incarcerated workers labor outside of those two systems 
and are instead employed directly by the state.143  Because the NLRA only 
 
 138 Trs. of Columbia Univ. in N.Y., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 at *5 (2016). 
 139 Goad, supra note 9, at 191. 
 140 Id. at 192–93. 
 141 Braden Campbell, New NLRB Rule Would Block Grad Student Unions, LAW360 (Sept. 
20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1197432 [https://perma.cc/Q6C7-NB6A]. 
 142 Vin Gurrieri, NLRB Adds Month To Comment Period For Grad Student Rule, LAW360 
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1223851/nlrb-adds-month-to-comment-
period-for-grad-student-rule [https://perma.cc/S3FW-96Z4]. 
 143 Approximately 870,000 inmates worked full time in 2014. Beth Schwartzapfel, The 
Great American Chain Gang: Why Can’t we Embrace the Idea that Prisoners Have Labor 
Rights?, AM. PROSPECT (May 28, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/great-american-chain-gang 
[https://perma.cc/8YZ4-5RFX]. However, as of June 2019, only 5,367 inmates worked in PIE 
programs. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INDUS. 
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applies to private employees, a favorable finding of inmate employee 
status—even one that leads to a “pilot project” of inmate unionization, as 
envisioned by Fink144—would only have limited applicability to the broader 
prisoner population.  Inmates working directly for the prison or for the state 
would not benefit.  As a result, the vast majority of incarcerated workers in 
state prisons would need to seek labor protections through other means, 
namely “the hodge-podge of state and local legal frameworks” governing 
collective bargaining for public-sector workers.145 
Though state and local organizing requires action on many fronts and 
would likely be a more intensive effort than seeking recognition at the NLRB, 
state labor relations boards overseeing public employees could be a valuable 
place for incarcerated workers unions to focus their energy.  This is because 
incarcerated worker unions would have more bites of the apple when seeking 
collective bargaining recognition.  An unfavorable decision by the NLRB 
might lead to a definition of “employee” that clearly excludes prisoners.146  
While such a decision would only apply to those incarcerated workers 
employed by private employers, it would be a major national setback for the 
incarcerated workers’ organizing movement as a whole. 
On the other hand, if one state’s labor relations board rejects a union’s 
application, the impact would be limited to that state.  This would still pose 
a setback (and, of course, prevent prisoners in that state from benefiting from 
engaging in collective bargaining), but it can also help organizers and 
lawyers in other states understand what the state of play might be.  
Furthermore, because each state’s public employee relations laws are 
distinct, incarcerated worker unions can tailor their approaches accordingly.  
If one state or several states positively recognize state incarcerated workers 
 
ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM CERTIFICATION & COST ACCOUNTING CTR LISTING, 
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s://perma.cc/4SWG-P9X6]. 
 144 See Fink, supra note 8, at 956. 
 145 MILLA SANES & JOHN SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RESEARCH, REGULATION 
OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES, 3 (2014). As stated in a recent 
student Note, “Further research is certainly necessary to develop a fuller, more nuanced 
treatment of the various state and federal statutory schemes that impact prison strikes.” Yoseph 
T. Desta, Note: Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1502 (2019). This Comment aims to provide a fuller, more nuanced 
treatment of one aspect of state law governing prison labor organizing. 
 146 While there is no stare decisis in NLRB decisions, circuit courts have held that “the 
Board may not depart . . . from its usual rules of decision to reach a different, unexplained 
result in a single case.” NLRB v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 460 F.2d 589, 604 
(5th Cir. 1972). Furthermore, the Board refers to its prior decisions as “precedent.” Goad, 
supra note 9, at 187. 
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as public employees and permit them to form unions, incarcerated workers 
can start building an evidence base that prisoner labor unions do not 
inherently pose a threat to the security of prisons.  Thus, if a case challenging 
Jones ever makes its way back up to the Supreme Court, incarcerated workers 
unions will have more ammunition to demonstrate that the state’s interest in 
limiting prisoners’ rights to association may not be as compelling as it 
seemed to Justice Rehnquist at the time of Jones. 
Below, this Comment examines the range of state statutes governing 
public sector collective bargaining, analyzing which ones might be amenable 
to recognizing incarcerated workers in state prisons as statutory 
employees.147  Next, this Comment examines several state labor relations 
board decisions that rejected incarcerated workers unions in the 1970s and 
1980s, unpacking the lessons from these decisions in order to develop 
arguments that incarcerated labor organizers can advance in the present day. 
B. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS ON THE 
STATE LEVEL: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR 
INCARCERATED WORKERS 
State labor laws vary, and some are more restrictive than others.  By 
examining the range of public sector collective bargaining statutes on the 
books, advocates and organizers can gain a better understanding of where 
best to focus their energy to advance the cause of incarcerated worker unions. 
A number of states statutorily ban collective bargaining for all public 
employees. These include North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.148  
Additionally, the Georgia and South Carolina Supreme Courts have found 
that collective bargaining is illegal for most public employees.149  State 
statutes in Delaware, Iowa, Florida, Maine, and Oregon explicitly exclude 
inmates from their definition of “public employee.”150  In these states, then, 
 
 147 The question of whether state incarcerated workers may be considered public 
employees is a threshold issue. There may be other state statutes in addition to public employee 
collective bargaining statutes that could provide barriers or opportunities to organize. 
 148 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95–98 (LEXIS through Sess. L. 2019-3); TEX. LOCAL GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 174.002 (Westlaw through 2019 Legis. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1–57.2 
(LEXIS through 2019 Legis. Sess.). 
 149 See Bd. Pub. Educ. For Savannah and Chatham, 204 S.E.2d 138 (Ga. 1974); Branch v. 
City of Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d 289, 292 (S.C. 2000) (“Unlike private employees, public 
employees in South Carolina do not have the right to collective bargaining.”). 
 150 See 19 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1302 (LEXIS through 82 Del. Laws ch. 218);  FLA. STAT. 
§ 477.203(3)(f) (LEXIS through 2019); IOWA CODE § 20.4 (2019 Legis. Sess.); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979(6)(k) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. 2019); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 243.650(19) (LEXIS through 2019 Sess.). 
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no pathway exists for state inmates engaged in prison labor to gain 
recognition as public employees for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
Some states, such as Alabama, Mississippi, and West Virginia, have no 
statutes whatsoever related to collective bargaining.151  Other states only 
have statutes related to collective bargaining for very limited sets of public 
employees, such as firefighters, police officers, and teachers, but have no 
framework or employment relations board to adjudicate labor claims brought 
by public employees more broadly.152  Thus, it would not be fruitful for 
incarcerated worker unions to seek formal recognition in these states either, 
although the result of such efforts is less certain than in the states with 
wholesale bars on public sector collective bargaining. 
Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho do not have statutes on public sector 
collective bargaining, but they do have executive orders or attorney general 
guidelines that permit the practice.153  Generally, these guidelines leave 
regulation of collective bargaining to the discretion of the municipality.154  
This too would limit the viability of incarcerated workers unions gaining 
formal recognition and labor protections.  It might also lead to a fragmented 
approach on the part of advocates and organizers with no clear statewide 
precedent emerging across municipalities. 
This leaves thirty states that statutorily permit collective bargaining and 
have definitions of “public employee” that do not explicitly exclude 
prisoners.  Of these, many have generic definitions, with few exceptions or 
qualifications.  One characteristic example from Alaska states, “‘public 
employee’ means any employee of a public employer, whether or not in the 
classified service of the public employer, except elected or appointed 
officials or superintendents of schools.”155  In states with similar statutes, 
incarcerated worker unions should make the case to the state labor relations 
board that they are public workers in much the same way that incarcerated 
workers in private industries might petition the NLRB. 
Among those states that permit collective bargaining for public 
employees, some have especially expansive definitions.  This may open up 
even greater opportunities.  For example, North Dakota’s Public Employees 
Relations Act defines an employee as “any person, whether employed, 
appointed, or under contract, providing services for the state, county, city, or 
 
 151 SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 145, at 12, 40, 65. 
 152 IND. CODE § 36-8-22 (Burns, LEXIS through 1st Reg. Sess. of 121st Gen. Assembly); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67A.6902 (LEXIS through 2019); 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51–101 (Westlaw 
through 1st Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49–101 (2019). 
 153 SANES & SCHMITT, supra note 145, at 14, 18, 26. 
 154 Id. at 27. 
 155 ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.250(6) (LEXIS through 2019 S.L.A.). 
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other political subdivision, for which compensation is paid.”156  While the 
section includes six exceptions to its definition of public employee, none of 
these include prisoners.157  Under the canon of construction expresio unius 
est exclusio alterius, the omission of prisoners from the excluded classes of 
public employee indicates that they could be included in the definition of 
public employees.  However, it does not appear that prisoner labor unions 
have ever sought to form in North Dakota.158 
A smaller subset of states have much more restrictive definitions of 
public employees that—while not explicitly excluding prisoners—may pose 
additional obstacles.  These include California, Hawaii, Maryland, and 
Vermont.159  For example, Vermont’s code grants much more discretion to 
its labor relations board: exempt from the definition of public employee is 
any group “determined after a hearing by the Board, upon petition of any 
individual desiring exclusion, of the employer, or of a collective bargaining 
unit, to be in a position that is so inconsistent with the spirit and intent of this 
chapter as to warrant exclusion.”160  California, Hawaii, and Maryland each 
have very clearly defined lists of who is and who is not a public employee. 
Although incarcerated workers do not appear on either the list of included or 
excluded public employees, their absence leaves less interpretive leeway for 
the Boards in these states, even if they were amenable to extending public 
employee benefits to incarcerated workers.  As a result, incarcerated workers 
unions may not wish to prioritize these states in their organizing.  This is a 
 
 156 N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-01(3) (LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 157 Id. 
 158 In addition to its broad statutory definition of a public employee, North Dakota may 
be an interesting place for incarcerated workers unions to test the waters for several reasons: 
the current head of North Dakota’s Department of Corrections is experimenting with 
Scandinavian-style prison reforms; it also has less of a history of race-based prison gangs due 
to its homogeneity. See Dashka Slater, North Dakota’s Norway Experiment, MOTHER JONES 
(July 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017/07/north-dakota-norway-priso
ns-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/AP39-R9PN]. However, just because North Dakota’s prison 
system might be reasonably amenable to reforms, other stakeholders such as the courts and 
the labor relations board would also have to be favorably disposed to incarcerated worker 
unions. The political calculus involved in determining whether these entities or their 
counterparts in other states might be open to recognizing collective bargaining rights for 
incarcerated workers is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 159 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3513 (Deering 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89–6 (Westlaw 
through Act 286 of 2019 Legis. Sess.); MD. STATE PERS. & PENS. CODE § 3–102 (LEXIS 
through 2019 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 3, § 902 (LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Sess. 
(excluding changes made by Vermont Legis. Council)). 
 160 VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 3, § 902. 
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shame because of California’s long, rich history with prison organizing161 
and its large prison population.162 
Though state statutes governing collective bargaining for public 
employees take a range of approaches—from banning collective bargaining 
wholesale to having broad definitions of who may be considered a public 
employee—there is considerable opportunity for incarcerated workers in 
thirty states.  Each one of these states’ public employee relations boards will 
likely take a different approach to interpreting its statute as it applies to 
incarcerated workers.  To that end, it is useful to consider the past decisions 
of some of these agencies. 
C. STATE LABOR BOARD DECISIONS ON INCARCERATED 
WORKERS 
The issue of whether incarcerated workers are state employees has come 
up in front of the labor boards of at least four states, only one of which has 
found in favor of their collective bargaining rights. 
In the successful petition, the Massachusetts State Labor Relations 
Commission approved members of the National Prisoners Reform 
Association (NPRA) at Walpole Prison as a collective bargaining unit, noting 
that “the prisoners did perform work for which they were paid by the 
state.”163  The Commission went on to identify thirty-one different work 
assignments engaged in by prisoners.164  This shows that it is not entirely 
fantastical to imagine that some states may approve collective bargaining for 
incarcerated workers. 
To determine which approaches and arguments may work today, it is 
also informative to examine the three unsuccessful cases and understand the 
reasons that state labor boards have declined to find inmates to be public 
employees. 
In the earliest of these cases, incarcerated workers at Green Haven 
Prison petitioned New York’s Public Employment Relations Board to be 
recognized as public employees.165  The Board found that incarcerated 
 
 161 See Part II.A., supra. 
 162 As of 2017, California had approximately 115,000 prisoners. California’s Prison 
Population, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.ppic.org/publication/calif
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 163 Heather Ann Thompson, Rethinking Working Class Struggle through the Lens of the 
Carceral State: Toward a Labour History of Inmates and Guards, in GLOBAL CONVICT 
LABOUR 411 (Christian Giuseppe De Vito & Alex Lichtenstein eds., 2015). 
 164 Id. 
 165 In re Prisoners’ Labor Union at Green Haven, 1973 WL 340350 6 PERB ¶ 3033 (NY 
PERB 1973). 
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workers had many attributes of an employee relationship with the state 
Department of Corrections, but that New York’s “Taylor Law,” which 
provided labor protections to public employees, was not intended to cover 
prisoners.166  This decision came, in part, from examining New York’s State 
Corrections Law, which says that state employment law applies to inmates 
on work-release programs.167  Because of the recognition that employment 
law applied to prisoners in this specific circumstance, the Public Relations 
Board found that inmates were excluded in more general circumstances.168  
Based on this decision, incarcerated workers seeking recognition as public 
employees in any state will want to consider whether other state labor statutes 
make exceptions for certain classes of inmates but not for others. 
Michigan’s Employment Relations Commission took a different 
approach in evaluating the merits of a prisoners’ labor union, finding an 
employment relationship but dismissing the petition for lack of statutory 
jurisdiction.169  The union appealed, and ultimately the Michigan Court of 
Appeals found that the primary relationship between incarcerated workers 
and the Department of Corrections was rehabilitative and penological, not 
vocational.170  As a result, Michigan’s Public Employment Relations Act did 
not cover the union, and their disputes instead had to be resolved within the 
Department of Corrections.171 
At the federal level, the NLRB has oscillated on the issue of whether 
employees may have more than one type of relationship with their employer 
(most recently, away from embracing the dual-relationship argument).172  
However, the NLRB’s decisions are not binding over state labor relations 
boards because of their distinct mandates.  As discussed above in the case of 
the NPRA in Massachusetts, some state labor relations boards may be more 
favorably inclined to find incarcerated workers both inmates and laborers. 
Finally, Ohio’s State Employment Relations Board (SERB) found that 
inmates were not public employees.173  When the inmates appealed, a state 
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court agreed that the SERB did not have jurisdiction over the inmates.174  The 
main reason for this was that the relationship between the inmates and the 
prison was not voluntary, and thus incarcerated workers could not be 
considered employees under state law.175  While the Sixth Circuit, which 
includes Ohio, has not weighed in the matter, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits have found that incarcerated workers’ status as inmates does not 
exclude them per se from labor protections.176  Indeed, these circuits have 
found that voluntariness is not the most critical factor, and instead that 
“determination of employee status focuses on economic reality and economic 
dependence.”177  The majority of the decisions on this matter came after 
Ohio’s ruling and could provide some strong counterarguments to challenge 
Ohio’s Appeals Court’s finding that voluntariness alone is sufficient to 
exclude inmates from labor laws.178 
Ultimately, these cases illustrate the range of statuses that states may 
ascribe to incarcerated workers under state collective bargaining statutes and 
indicate several arguments that modern incarcerated worker unions could 
advance to seek legal recognition.  The approach in any of the thirty states 
that permit collective bargaining and do not explicitly exclude prisoners will 
surely vary widely based on the nature of the individual union, the totality of 
a state’s other laws governing corrections, past decisions by the state labor 
board, and state-level jurisprudence around the definition of a public 
employee.  However, the broader point is that in some states, incarcerated 
workers may be able to pass the threshold issue of being recognized as public 
employees—though it will surely be an uphill battle in most cases.179 
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CONCLUSION 
Justice Brandeis wrote that states may “serve as a laboratory[] and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”180  Incarcerated worker unions can use the differences in state 
collective bargaining statutes and various state labor boards’ attitudes to their 
advantage.  By gaining certification under state collective bargaining 
statutes, workers can build a body of knowledge demonstrating the viability 
of prisoner labor organizing.  Unions in different states can experiment with 
distinct approaches to seeking recognition from their state labor relations 
board and learn from each other’s successes and failures. 
Between seeking state-level recognition as public employee collective 
bargaining units and seeking federal private-sector recognition through the 
NLRB, incarcerated workers have numerous avenues to pursue in order to 
achieve labor protections and union recognition.  Following such 
recognition, successful and peaceful negotiations between unions and prison 
administrators can ultimately create an evidence base that can one day be 
used to rebut the argument advanced by Justice Rehnquist in Jones that “the 
presence, perhaps even the objectives, of a prisoners’ labor union is 
detrimental to the order and security in the prisons.”181 
By utilizing the complementary approaches of seeking recognition 
under federal and state labor laws, incarcerated workers can chart a path 
forward that allows them to address concerns about power imbalances, racial 
inequity, and labor exploitation posed by prison labor.  While incarcerated 
workers may not presently have a constitutional freedom of association, they 
have other tools at their disposal with which they can seek to assert their 
rights.  As Pete Seeger sang in Talking Union, a song describing the steps 
workers must take to start a union, “You may be down and out, but you ain’t 
beaten.”182 
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